Andrew LaVelle, University of New Mexico
Propositional Metonymy and Logical Consequence
Compared to referential metonymy, which has been studied for at least two millennia since Hellenistic Greek times, propositional metonymy (henceforth PM) was only very recently identified and defined by Beatrice Warren (1999 and 2006) and to a lesser extent by Klaus-Uwe Panther and Linda Thornburg (1999 and 2004). Formerly PM was either confounded with referential metonymy or equated with implication, conversational implicature, or simply inference, and its present recategorization as an independent type of metonymy remains controversial. Moreover, there is still little agreement on what the precise requirements are for PM.
In any PM, such as “It won’t happen while I still breathe” (i.e., live), one proposition implies another by way of an antecedent-consequent relation that is created by the logical operator if-then: “If I breathe, then I live”. More specifically, the relation between the antecedent and the consequent can be based on either contingency or necessity, with the latter being the case in this particular conditional since breathing is requisite for human life. Warren (2006: 7-11) qualifies such examples involving necessity as equally legitimate instantiations of PM, whereas Panther and Thornburg (2004: 98-99) discount them as being genuinely metonymic on the grounds that only contingent relations, in their judgment, can trigger metonymization.
In this paper the argument will be made that necessity-based PM as exemplified above is indeed a genuine subtype of metonymy given that it conforms to this trope’s three definitional criteria:
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Metonymy must violate the Gricean maxim of either quality or relevancy in order for figuration to obtain. (In the case of synecdoche the maxim of quantity pertains.)
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It must be an indexical trope – i.e., the tropic referential transfer must be accomplished by indexicality (in opposition to iconicity).
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Its indexicalization must be mediated by a hierarchical relation between its two referents (i.e., the source and the target), thereby eliminating such nonhierarchical relations as adjacency.
The position taken by Panther and Thornburg that PMs based on necessity are not metonymic is rejected here since it can be demonstrated that their additional criterion for metonymy – namely that the relation between its two referents must be merely contingent and not necessary – is actually superfluous. In fact, there is a continuum of logical consequence (i.e., entailment) in PM that ranges from medium probability to absolute certainty. Most importantly, it will be shown that for any PM to function properly its two propositions (the antecedent and the consequent) must be perceived as being sufficiently relevant vis-à-vis each other.
References:
----------. 2004. The Role of Conceptual Metonymy in Meaning Construction. Metaphorik.de. 91-116.
