Lindsey N. Chen, University of Southern California
Two Flavors of Mass in Spanish
An observation about mass terms in Spanish, and one not often discussed, is that they seem to come in two kinds- prototypical mass (agua ‘water’, oro ‘gold’, nieve ‘snow’) and collective mass (mueble ‘furniture’, calzado ‘footwear’). In Spanish, the two kinds of mass terms-henceforth PM and CM- differ from each other in a number of respects. First, plural morphology is available to CM but not PM (muebles - *aguas). Second, CM can be directly combined with a numeral whereas PM cannot (dos muebles - *dos agua). Third, they differ in terms of verb agreement. PM agrees with verbs in the singular form but not verbs in the plural form (La nieve se ha/* han derretido ‘The snow has/*have melted). CM, however, can agree with verbs in the plural form (Los muebles han llegado ‘The furniture have arrived’).
Within this paper, it is proposed that the two kinds of mass terms have different extensions and operate on wholly different ontological levels. Whereas PM denote quantities of substance in their extension, CM have only sets of individuals in their extension.
The difference between the two is essentially a difference between mererology versus sets. On the one hand, PM fit the traditional fusion view of mass terms. Such is the view of Cartwright (1970, 1979), who subscribes to the idea that the referents of mass terms exist in the form of entities called ‘quantities’. In reference to homogeneity, quantities are like temporal sequences or events- all satisfy the logical properties of cumulativity and dissectivity (cf. Simons 1987). On the other hand, CM fit the (plural) individual view of, among others, Link (1983), who proposed that mass terms refer to a collection of discrete entities.
Metaphysically speaking, these are two very conflicting claims about what a mass term denotes. For instance, the plurality view would be appropriate for terms like muebles but not agua. The reference of muebles ‘furniture’ can be divided into discrete objects. Because of this possibility, we can pick out an individual object (the thing called muebles) and count how many there are in a given space. Terms like agua ‘water’ on the other hand, do not divide their reference into discrete objects and as such we cannot ask how many water there are. The plurality view, then, is not able to provide reference for a broad class of kind of mass items. On the other hand, a quantity-based account may not be apt for mass terms like muebles ‘furniture’ since quantities cannot directly individuate physical objects. Individuation is possible only with the help of an “individuator” (Quine 1960) such as a measure or classifier phrase (e.g. ‘a liter/glass of’).
The very conflicting nature of existing claims indicates that the reference of mass terms continues to be an elusive notion. Yet it need not be. By recognizing the distinction within the category of mass terms, the current proposal avoids the confusion that results in lumping different mass terms in one category referenced by the same ontological entity.
